MAKING EUROPEAN MERGER POLICY MORE PREDICTABLE IBD

Sinopse

Chapter 1. Predictability as a Crucial Condition for Economics Growth and Development 1. Introductory Remarks. 2. Some Theoretical Consideration Concerning Predictability. 3. Some Empirical Results Concerning Predictability. 4. The Predictability of European Merger Policy. 5. Proposals for Improving Predictability. Chapter 2. Development in Competition Theory. 1. Introductory Remarks. 2. The Harvard Approach. 3. The Chicago Approach. 4. Contestability Theory. 5. The Contribution of Game Theory: the New Industrial Organization. 6. The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics: Transaction Cost Economics. 7. In lieu of a Summary: Consensus and Dissensus Between the Various Approaches. Chapter 3. Trends in the Business Environment. 1. Liberalisation as a Driving Force of Globalisation. 2. Economic and Technical Factors. 3. Conclusions. Chapter 4. Possible consequences of Trends in Theory (B) and Developments in Business (C) for Competition Policy. 1. Introduction. 2. From Market Definition to Assessing Dominance. 3. A Closer Look at Barriers to Entry and Contestability. 4. Assessing Collective Dominance. Chapter 5. Case Studies. 1. Assessment of Barriers to Entry in European Merger Control: The Cases of Volvo/Scania, Mercedes-Benz/Kässbohrer, and MAN/Auwärter. 2. Assessment of Barriers to Entry in European Merger Control: The Cases of SCA/Metsä Tissue and SCA Hygiene Products/ Cartoinvest. 3. Assessment of Barriers to Entry in European Merger Control: The Case of BASF/Bayer/Hoechst/Dystar.4. Assessment of Barriers to Entry in European Merger Control: The Markets for Telecommunications in the Case of Telia/Telenor. 5. Collective Dominance under the European Merger Regulation. Chapter 6. Practical Proposals. 1. Introductory remarks. 2. Overview of Substantive proposals as Developed in Chapter 4. 3. Procedural Proposals. 4. Conclusions and Outlook. Appendix. Endnotes. References. Index.